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Abstract

The relationship of anger, the tendency to believe in conspiracies, and the tendency to believe a
short statement accompanied by a related image was investigated. The Generic Conspiracist
Belief (GCB) scale and the Spielberger State-Trait Anger Scale (STAS) were presented to 154
participants, including 125 females and 28 males, before the presentation of 12 statements of fact
which were each accompanied by images related to the statements. The belief in conspiracy
scores and the trait anger scores significantly predicted the tendency to believe the statements
accompanied by images, explaining 55% of the variance (R2=.553, F(2,151)=95.77, p<.01).
These findings suggest that a tendency to react with anger and a tendency to believe conspiracy
theories are strong predictors of how a person will respond to dramatic combinations of
statements of fact and images.
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Anger, Internet Memes, and Belief
Factual claims encountered in the media are often so complex that the average person
does not have command of the information needed to evaluate the claims. For instance, few
people have read or are able to understand the implications of the original research that relates to
climate change or the relationship between playing violent video games and violent behavior, but
such relationships are often cited in popular media. Most people must rely on the summaries of
information found in the various forms of media and in informal discussions with peers. When
presented with conflicting sources of information, a person must make an independent evaluation
of the accuracy of the claims.
How can a person confidently choose one group of experts, one information source over
another? It has been suggested that:
We ignore complexity by overestimating how much we know about how things work, by
living life in the belief that we know how things work even when we don’t. We tell
ourselves that we understand what’s going on, that our opinions are justified by our
knowledge, and that our actions are grounded in justified beliefs even though they are
not. We tolerate complexity by failing to recognize it. That’s the illusion of
understanding. (Sloman & Fernback, 2017, p. 34).
There are some assertions in which one opinion is supported by a large majority while the
minority maintains a vigorous defense of the opposing position. When the minority views seem
to ignore commonly accepted ideas of cause and effect, those views are sometimes referred to as
‘conspiracy theories’ (Brotherton et al., 2013). When a person who maintains an opinion about
these theories seems to be basing the belief on something other than a logical evaluation of the
available information, the opinion is referred to as ‘conspiracist ideation’. One implication is
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that a person who engages in conspiracist ideation keeps looking for explanations after finding
the commonly accepted explanation for an event to not be emotionally satisfying (Brotherton &
French, 2014).
If people feel confident in a decision for which they had incomplete information, it could
be because they have been influenced by rhetorical devices, past emotional associations, or
information processing shortcuts. A clever play on words, alliteration, or dramatic, emotional
messages may be lacking in factual content, but they still may affect the information processing
and decision making processes. One heuristic which may underlie confidence ratings is the
Availability Heuristic. It suggests that overestimating the frequency judgement may inflate
confidence judgements. Anything that makes a fact more memorable may unconsciously impact
the evaluation of accuracy (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973; Braga & Ferreira, 2013)
Existing emotional associations with the topic under consideration is another factor that
may have an impact on the decision to believe one set of assertions over another. Rusting (1998)
discusses the network theory of affect in which emotions activate emotion-related memories and
cognitive processes. The Speilberger State Trait Anger Scale (STAS) provides one measure of a
person’s tendency to react to stimuli with anger. State Anger (SA) is defined as “an emotional
state or condition that consists of subjective feelings of tension, annoyance, irritation, fury and
rage, with concomitant activation or arousal of the autonomic nervous system” and Trait Anger
(TA) is defined “in terms of individual differences in the frequency that S-Anger was
experienced over time” (Spielberger et al., 1983). Parrott et al., (2005) compared groups high in
TA to those low in TA. In a lexical decision task, those in the high TA group processed anger
words more quickly than any other type. For those in the low TA group, there were no
differences between any word type groups. This indicates that, in contrast to those who score
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low on the TA scale, those who are predisposed to react with anger process words related to
anger differently than other types of words.
There is a style of online posting of information in which a short text statement is
accompanied by a related photo. This social media posting style will be referred to in this
context as an ‘Internet Meme’ (IM). The concept of meme was popularized by Dawkins (1976).
Blackmore (1999) pointed out that, while it may seem that a meme contributes to the success of a
person or group, the success is entirely a result of competition among memes. The continued
transmission of a meme is based largely on the characteristics of the meme that causes it to be
copied and transmitted. The Parrot et al., (2005) finding that words related to anger are
processed more quickly than other words suggests that an IM containing words that are
associated with anger would have an advantage when it comes to the competition between
memes. This would mean a greater likelihood of the meme being copied and spread.
Any regular consumer of popular media encounters many presentations of information
every day and they are received in formats that are easy to copy and then send to multiple
recipients. A person who sends information that they have recently received may be reinforced
by seeing responses to their posts or seeing that people forward the information to others,
increasing the impact. Characteristics of the information which are relevant to the likelihood of a
meme’s success may include length, topic, and visual impact. The text component of an IM is
often short. A simple phrase or sentence could be read in a second or two, almost automatically,
so they would be more likely than longer passages to be processed completely (Mano et al.,
2016; Rawson & Middleton, 2009; Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977). The fact that the text is
accompanied by an image makes it visually distinctive, making it easier to recall, and, according
to the Availability Heuristic, more likely to be judged to be true (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973;
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Braga et al., 2012). Both the text and the image may contribute to an emotional response, as
suggested by Beall and Herbert (2008) who found that faces that displayed emotion were
processed more automatically than words with emotional content. Kintch (1988) discusses how,
in the course of understanding of discourse, the proposition must be combined with knowledge
about the world, making it a richer knowledge structure. It is common for an IM to use images
designed to elicit an emotional response. If an emotionally charged image is processed first, it
may set up a biasing context for the text.
Kintch’s (1988) concept of knowledge structures is consistent with Bartlett’s original
conception of schema which included the idea that a schema was a structure that interacted with
the environment (Bartlett, 1995; McVee et al., 2005). This makes any schema a product of both
the person’s cognitive structures and the environmental stimuli. The finding that those high on
TA are more likely to respond with anger to any given stimulus (Speilberger et al., 1983) and that
those high on TA processed the anger-related words more quickly (Parrott et al., 2005) would
seem to be consistent with the concept of an interactive schema in which images may influence
the perceived meaning of the associated text. Stevens et al., (2018) found that both TA and
Magical Ideation were significant predictors of scores on the Generic Conspiracist Belief (GCB)
scale (Brotherton et al., 2013).
It was hypothesized that those who tend to believe in conspiracies, as measured by the
GCB scale, and those high on TA will be more likely to believe the truth of statements presented
in the form of an IM. In addition, it was predicted that TA scores would be positively correlated
with the assessment of the truth of IM statements, while State Anger (SA) would not, as the SA
measure would be assessing the degree to which the ongoing participation in the study aroused
anger.
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Method
Participants
Students (125 females, 28 males, and 1 who declined to respond to the question about
gender, Mage = 20.02 years, range: 18-51, 8 Native American, Asian/Pacific Islander, 51 Black or
African American, 85 White/Caucasian, 10 Multiple Ethnicity) were recruited from
undergraduate psychology classes at a small, southern university. Participating instructors
provided a link to their classes which would allow them to access the study using an online
survey service, constituting a convenience sample. Students who participated in the study were
eligible for extra credit in the classes from which they were recruited.
Materials
Conspiracist ideation was assessed using the GCB scale (Brotherton, French, &
Pickering, 2013), a 59-item questionnaire designed to assess the general tendency to endorse
theories which are unlikely to be true. Participants were presented with a 5-point scale with the
choices of, “1: definitely not true, 2: probably not true, 3: not sure/cannot decide; 4: probably
true; 5: definitely true. SA and TA were assessed using the STAS (Spielberger, Jacobs, Russell,
& Crane, 1983) which is comprised of 30 questions, 15 to assess SA and 15 to assess TA. The
SA questions address the current state of the respondent, such as, “I am mad”. The possible
responses were, “1 = not at all, 2 = Somewhat, 3 = Moderately so, 4 = Very much so”. The TA
questions address the general tendency to respond in certain ways, such as, “I have a fiery
temper”. The meme confidence task was comprised of 12 images each associated with a short
statement and the opportunity to rate each one on a scale of 1 (Least Confident) to 7 (Most
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Confident). The images were created for this task and were based on memes found online (see
Appendix).
Procedure
The information was collected using a commercial online survey service. Upon
accessing the link to the study, after responding to the consent form, each participant was asked
to answer a short set of demographic questions, followed by the GCB, the STAS, and the
assessment of confidence for each of 12 meme images.
Results
As shown in Table 1, the confidence ratings of the meme images (IM) correlated
significantly with each of the other three measures. TA (M = 27.57, SD = 8.22) was
significantly correlated with CGB (M = 194.90, SD = 40.74).
Table 1
Correlations Among IM, TA, SA, and GCB
Variable Pairings
IM
GCB
IM
TA
IM
SA
TA
GCB
SA
GCB

Pearson’s r
r(152)=.725
r(152)=.269
r(152)=.209
r(152)=.220
r(152)=.035

p-value
<.01
<.001
<.001
.006
.669

A step-wise multiple regression analysis was performed to determine the degree to which
CGB scores, TA scores, and SA (M = 21.10, SD = 8.67) scores predict the belief in the accuracy
of the statements presented in the IM task (M = 38.44, SD = 15.43). It was found that GCB
scores and TA scores significantly predicted performance on the IM scores, explaining 55% of
the variance (R2=.553, F(2,151)=95.77, p<.001). It was found that the scores on the GCB
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significantly predicted IM scores (β = .718, p<.001), as did TA scores (β = .18, p<.001). SA
scores did not contribute significantly to the model.
Discussion
The question of why a small minority of seemingly normal people maintain views that
contrast distinctly with the majority view may be relevant to understanding the belief in what
people commonly call conspiracy theories. Why people assert the truth of unlikely theories is
surely a complex phenomenon with many contributing causes. This study addressed the impact
that IMs have on the tendency to believe an assertion of fact.
The fact that the GCB scores correlated significantly with endorsement of the truth of
statements presented in the IM with was not surprising as both the GCB questions and the text
component of the IM judgements were related to the acceptance of assertions that would
generally be considered to be minority opinions. Spielberger’s conception of TA (Spielberger,
Jacobs, Russell, & Crane, 1983) is that it measures a tendency for an individual to react to
stimuli with anger. The correlation of TA with the IM measure suggests that, when viewing the
same stimuli, those who tend to react with anger are more likely to accept what is being asserted.
This impact on belief that is not based in information content could be an important factor in
understanding the impact of our current information environment.
The general purpose of this line of research is to understand the factors that influence
people when they make decisions about complex issues based on incomplete information, which
is often the case in complex societal issues. The fact that both the scores on the GCB and the TA
correlated positively suggests that a person who is predisposed to believe in conspiracies and
who is also predisposed to react with anger is the type of person most likely to accept the truth of
a statement accompanied by an image that provides an anger-inducing context. This study
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suggests that a tendency to react with anger and a tendency to accept theories that are not
commonly accepted predisposes a person to accept the truth of controversial statements
presented with related images. Given the number of statements on social media that are
presented in the IM fashion, the characteristics of media as well as the characteristics of the
consumers of media are important to investigate when attempting to understand the public
reaction to many complex social issues.
Conclusion
The correlation between GCB and TA scores indicates that those who tend to react to
stimuli with anger also tend to endorse ideas that a majority finds unlikely. The regression model
in which GCB and TA predicted the belief in the statements which were associated with images
(IM) indicates that, while correlated, both variables make unique contributions to the prediction.
A person high in TA is predisposed to react to stimuli with anger (Spielberger et al., 1983).
Parrott et al., (2005) found that people high in TA “displayed facilitative biases in the processing
of semantic anger-related stimuli” and the current study has extended that finding to stimuli that
combine imagery and text. The fact that the GCB made a significant contribution to the
prediction of the reaction to the memes indicates that it is due to cognitive processes not related
to anger.
Stevens et al., (2018) found a correlation between the GCB and a measure of Magical
Ideation (MI). Eckblad and Chapman (1983) described MI as belief in the causal relationship of
events which the dominant view in the person’s culture to be that the events cannot be causally
related. These might include psychokinetic effects, good luck charms, or the presence of secret
messages in the environment. While the relationship of TA and belief in conspiracy theories
points to an emotional component, the correlation between MI and the GCB suggest thinking
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processes not driven by emotion. The statement, “The Magical Ideation Scale is, therefore, a
reasonable measure to use in attempts to predict future psychosis” (Eckblad & Chapman, 1983,
p. 223) suggests that those high in MI might have basic failures in logical processing. There are
surely many factors that contribute to the belief in conspiracy theories, both emotional and based
in failures of logical processing.
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